Whether Russia wins or is lost in Ukraine, one is safe: the Russian army will have to be rebuilt.

With his exhausted arsenal and his defeated reputation, Russia will have to have to have in the long -term race form of its armed forces. The maximum most possible characteristics will date back to an Army of Soviet mass in the adoption of a smaller but more flexible western army, according to a new exam through the reflected images group Rand Corp. , founded in Washington. But all these characteristics are difficult to put in force or not give the route of the failures of the Russian army system.

Concentrated for the moment in the victory of the war in Ukraine, the Kremlin adheres to what he knows: a giant soldier designed to combat opposite to wonderful terrestrial wars. “Moscow has, at the moment, embark on the reconstruction of the armed forces based on a family style for the leaders of the Russian army, an organization that was very critical for past reform attempts,” Randarray wrote nowhere This transparent desire that in the land forces of Russia, which have lost thousands of armored vehicles, many thousands of infantry soldiers and have been reinforced with convicted persons.

After the war, Russia will have to evaluate its objectives, resources and the foreign situation, in front of the West, which has imposed export controls that, if they remain in place, will obstruct the ‘reconstruction effort.

Rand is contemplating 4 tactics to rebuild Russia. The first is what Rand Surpers the “Shoigu” Plan, based on statements through Sergei Shoigu, a nearby spouse of the Russian leader Vladimir Putin, who directed the Minister of Defense at 2024. This would make the Russian army out before It was what it was before. The Ukraine War. It would verify to balance mass and fire power through the expansion and modernization of the army, and through vital weapons to compensate for internal deficits.

What is maximum is that the Shoigu Plan assumes that Russia’s army is necessarily intelligently, regardless of evidence otherwise in Ukraine. He maintains that “the Russian armed forces were not structurally defective, at least for clashes such as those of the Donbas [Ukraine] (2014) and Syria region (2015), as much as they were led in the early stages of the initial stages of the Initial stages of the initial stages of the initial stages of the initial stages of the initial stages of the initial stages of the initial stages of the initial stages of the shock and cannot execute in the context of superior intensity shocks in a disputed environment “, The study said.

Another option is to completely put the reforms proposed in 2008, which would create a smaller but larger quality army designed for hybrid war, adding cyber and data operations, and personal personal vendors as the old Wagner group. “This technique would lead to a serious attempt to continue with workers’ reforms and prioritize the progression and use of asymmetric war means,” Rand said. The hybrid war is based on intimidation and disturbances, the operations denied to undermine NATO states and not aligned, however, this plan is probably not the duration of the solar force to enlarge Russian hegemony.

The third option is the maximum radical. Jummer, the old Soviet and Russian war modes and create a completely new army system. This can mean the copy of the tactics of other nations, such as the least inflexible command and discovering in the Western armies and launching a classic army culture.

This concept is based on “the awareness that the Soviet and Russian operational models are no longer viable, it stood out through the poor functionality of the Russian armed forces in Ukraine,” Rand wrote.

Ironically, the simplest option of Russia is not to move in the future, but rather to return to the past. This path would see the Russian army return to the Soviet era, with great armies of armed recruits with great weapons built through the base of the defustrial defense of Russia. “An underlying argument for this path is that the Russian army, in many ways, had to return to this style its war in Ukraine depending on the oldest systems, an overwhelming power of fire and a mass, and although it did not lead to a decision Decisive resolution of the Russian victory in Ukraine, it was enough to succeed in a dead end, “Rand wrote.

A Soviet flavor soldier is “one more adjustment for the existing leaders of Russia, whether political and army, because it is still highly centralized and aimed at mass and wear,” said Mark’s business information, Cozad, co -author of the study Rand.

It is general that the nations analyze and incorporate classes after a war, especially for the waste side. The Germans studied their defeat the First World War, and the advent of new technologies such as the reservoir and the plane, to design their Blitzkrieg strategy the Second World War, while the failure of the United States in Vietnam stimulated the reforms of the army they had fruits in the desert. .

Russia’s record on army reform is checkered. The defeat of World War I generated inventions in the war mechanized through Soviet theorists such as General Mikhail Tukhachevsky in the 1930s. A bad functionality of struggle in Chehenia in the 1990s, and Georgia in 2008, he drove to called to changes, such as the distance of the armies of mass recruitment to a professional voluntary force.

The challenge is that these reforms have tended to be hindered through blocks of stumbling blocks such as the economic misfortunes of Russia after the Cave of the Soviet Union, reactionary generals of the Soviet era resistant to change, copinism and politicians distrust their own army; Tukhachevsky executed through Stalin in 1938.

Rand expects Russia, although everything decides on an aggregate of the other reform options. The final resolution will be molded through several factors, adding the finish of the Ukraine War, the Russian Economic Force, the fall in the birth rate, the ability to expand and manufacture complex army technologies, the opportunity to import technologies that They cannot occur at the national point and relations with allies such as China.

Many will have the way Russia reads the classes of the Ukraine War. Until now, his history has not encouraged trust. “In general, the perceptions of the experts of the Russian army about the nature of the long -term war did not materialize in the war in Ukraine,” said Rand’s study, since overestimating the effect of the Air Force and the form on form on That the way was done. The war replaced the maneuver.

Russia would probably decide to return to a Soviet army “if the war ends and Putin moves away through pointing out and believing that Russia has succeeded, because this is what ended up running and Russia is limited by curtains and technical factors,” Cozad said. “At one time, if Putin left the stage, you can see more drastic changes. “

Be that as it may, the United States and NATO will have to monitor how Russia reconstructs their soldiers, warns Cozad. Whatever the chosen style, “they have impressive capabilities that will take a strong position in their long -term traditional forces, especially in the fields of war and electronic drones. “

The harmful maximum can be an army of Soviet Mass. In fact, it would be smaller than the 12 million infantry soldiers deployed through the Red Army in 1945, however, it may be superior to the 1. 5 million active personnel decreed through Putin in 2024 “. On the scenarios beyond 3 decades, and we did not have to resolve the position and the existent disorders related to the opposite combat to an enemy built on mass and wear, “Cozad said.

Michael Peck is a defense whose paintings have given the impression of Forbes, News, Defense Policy Magazine and other publications. He has a Master in Rutgers Univ Political Science. Follow it on Twitter and LinkedIn.

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