At the recent eighth Congress of the Workers’ Party of Korea (WPK), North Korean leaders announced plans and systems to expand their nuclear deterrence, in particular the progression of miniaturized nuclear warheads, tactical nuclear weapons, and several independently targeted re-entry cars (MIRVs). ), forged fuel ballistic missiles of other ranges, nuclear propulsion systems for submarines and hypersonic cars with slippery acceleration. There are already indications in Yongbyon and the defense institutes that activities are taking place in those plans.

It is an ambitious programme for a small country suffering from economic mismanagement, severe United Nations (UN) sanctions and the effects of the pandemic and herbal disasters. Some of these projects have been in progress in recent years, but it will take more than a decade to expand complex systems such as nuclear-weapon MIRV, nuclear submarines with missiles, and hypersonic sliding weapons. [1] In addition, all of this will require an increase in the production of fisssibles (plutonium and enriched uranium) and nuclear warhead testing, which would violate the provisions of UN Security Council resolutions.

To satisfy short-term desires for plutonium and uranium production, North Korea would like to build an additional nuclear reactor to produce plutonium; Expand its current capacity to reprocess spent fuel and enrich uranium; Increase the extraction, crushing, conversion and manufacture of nuclear uranium fuel for the five MWe reactor and the experimental soft water reactor (ELWR) in Yongbyon; and in all likelihood to identify some other nuclear control site for higher performance nuclear weapons controls. [2] Ideally, it is worth building a new infrastructure to put into effect the nuclear plans declared by the North; however, given its economic constraints, the North would most likely derive every conceivable benefit from the existing nuclear infrastructure at Yongbyon, activities that would be visual. in satellite images.

In his final speech, Kim Jong Un also indicated that North Korea would possibly have failed in the production of ammunition. Public reports from the Party Congress did not provide the main points for these failures, but this would possibly recommend that North Korea has not achieved everything. targets through the next nuclear deterrence. An indication of this is the slow launch of the ELWR in Yongthroughon, which are the expected operating dates published in 2010. It is not known whether these delays are similar to reactor design and structure, fuel manufacturing or the need for uranium enrichment. It is also possible that the enriched uranium desires of the nuclear weapons program are higher than those of the ELWR.

Kim also pushes on his speeches to strengthen national defense capacity in quality and quantity, including strengthening the “deterrence of nuclear war. “Studies related to defense and progression systems highlighted in Congressional reports are a component of these efforts.

Kim’s statements will raise concerns, mainly in the United States, China, South Korea and Japan. The miniaturization of nuclear warheads is essential for the construction of tactical nuclear warheads for short-range missiles that threaten the forces of the Republic of Korea, Japan and the United States founded in the region.

In the longer term, strengthening North Korea’s nuclear deterrence will also fuel South Korea’s aspirations to obtain nuclear-powered submarines in reaction to North Korea’s threats and Japanese ambitions to move forward with its progression plans, including traditional warheads to counter existing ones. and long-term missile capabilities of North Korea (and China).

North Korea’s nuclear plans, while limited through limited resources, are likely to aim to build a consummate event before imaginable denuclearization talks with Biden administration and expand North Korea’s influence in negotiations. The debate in Pyongyang on its nuclear program will continue on Sunday. (January 19) with the assembly of the Supreme People’s Assembly, which historically blesses the decisions of the WPK Congress.

The DPRK’s new five-year economic plan is expected to count the revision of North Korea’s policy by the new Biden administration. While the continued expansion of North Korea’s nuclear functions is a major concern, slower-than-expected progress in its nuclear systems suggests it would. this may be the time for a full review and commitment to the regional parties on the emergence of a technique not unusual for North Korea’s nuclear problem.

Hypersonic sliding cars (HGVs) are delivered to the most sensitive of a medium- or long-range missile. They do not adhere to the trajectory of a ballistic missile, but their ability to maneuver after being released from their rocket thrusters makes it difficult to detect. Track and kill them. Russia and China have evolved and deployed such weapons. The U. S. hypersonic vehicle is expanding. Brazil, India and Japan are known to expand such missiles. Read more: Kelly M. Sayler and Amy F. Woolf, Defense Primer : Hypersonic Boost-Glide Weapons, CRS IF11459 (Washington, DC, Congressional Research Service, December 1, 2020), https://fas. org/sgp/ crs/natsec/IF11459. pdf.

Punggye-ri in particular is feared to have deteriorated as a result of the September 2017 high-performance test.